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What are the Rights of the
Involuntary Divorcee? Reflections
on Divisible Divorce
By ROBERT F. Dmnmw, S.J.*
One of the many anomalies in the law regulating the lives of
divorced persons is the fact that few appellate decisions and
even fewer lawyers or judges have given much consideration to
the question of the identity, the rights and the precise legal status
of an ex-wife. It is assumed without any apparent doubt that an
ex-wife, regardless of the extent of moral misbehavior on her
part, may retain the name of the man she married. With almost
the same certainty every ex-wife is presumably entitled to some
type of alimony, and in about 95 percent of all cases she will
get custody of the children of the marriage.
All available evidence appears to indicate that a large number
of divorced women-perhaps the vast majority of them-remarry
rather quickly after their divorce. There have been consequently
few occasions for the courts to discuss and decide upon the rights
of an ex-wife in cases unencumbered and unclouded by disputed
factual issues about property, children and/or step-children.
The whole thrust of divorce law is in the direction of con-
structing a formula by which each and every right of the ex-wife
would be settled at the moment that the marriage, which is the
basis of all her rights, is dissolved. For better or for worse, how-
ever, it seems increasingly difficult to extinguish all the rights of
an ex-wife even when the marriage, from which alone these
rights were created, is "dissolved."
Purists and absolutists in the law-especially when they repre-
sent would-be ex-husbands-insist that marriage is just another
*Professor of Family Law and Dean, Boston College Law School, member
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contract and that when the parties to the contract, with judicial
permission, sever the bond they should be allowed to determine
at that time the nature and extent of their obligations to each
other in perpetuity. Other jurists, however,-particularly when
they represent prospective ex-wives-reason that marriage cannot
be reduced to the level of the ordinary commercial contract. In
every marriage, they would argue, a woman changes her position
irrevocably; she assumes a new name and a break-up of her
marriage for any reason besides the death of the husband brings
upon her harms which the husband must provide for, not merely
by the divorce settlement but by assuming some type of perpetual
duty towards his ex-wife so long as she bears his name.
If the legal fictions about grounds and defenses employed in
divorce actions had more validity we might be able to refine the
problem a bit by postulating a hypothesis that the ex-wife whose
misconduct alone caused the divorce would not be entitled to the
benefits due to the "innocent" wife. As is well known, however,
about 80 percent of all divorces are secured by the wife and in
almost 70 percent of all divorce cases the ground is "cruelty". For
these reasons any definition of the term "ex-wife" must realis-
tically include al former wives, even those whose conduct was
the sole cause of the divorce.
Although the law has not developed very much literature
about the identity, nature and rights of ex-wives, there appears
to have developed nonetheless a pragmatic way to settle the
claims of the 400,000 American women who each year assume
the status of "ex-wives". At least most divorcees, having agreed to
and accepted in writing the most advantageous property and
financial arrangement they can secure, do not return to the courts
to plead for a better settlement of the claims which they obtained
as wives. Nor do many women who agreed to allow their hus-
bands a divorce-by some type of informal if not collusive consent
-return to the courts to complain about their bargain.
Anyone with even a minimum acquaintance with divorce
procedures will recognize that there exists little if any reliable
information on the forces operating on a wife when either she
and/or her husband have come to the decision that a divorce is
the best solution to their marital problems. If both parties agree
to give their consent to whatever legal and financial arrangement
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is to be worked out the rights of the ex-wife are obviously subject
to the adage "volenti non fit injuria." Until or unless an ex-wife
can show that her consent to become an ex-wife was induced by
coercion and pressure which should in justice permit her to
rescind her consent, any petition on her part to renounce the
status of an ex-wife to which she consented can hardly be
expected to receive very much support, at least according to the
ordinary rules of contract law.
The future, however, may well bring about a widespread
feeling that a wife whose husband desires to divorce her cannot
realistically be said to be in a position of consenting freely to a
request by her husband for a divorce. It is one of the silent
premises of the concept of romantic love on which modem mar-
riage seems to be based that it is wrong to continue to live with a
spouse who no longer has "love" for you. According to the same
philosophy of marriage it is improper and even immoral for a
husband or wife not to secure a divorce if he or she no longer has
love" for the other spouse.
If this outlook on marriage can in any way be said to be a part
of the law regulating the tripartite contract of marriage its
incorporation into this law further complicates the issue of the
freedom or the non-coercion of a wife during the period in which
she arranges for a divorce.
The basic difficulty in assessing the voluntariness of a wife's
part in securing a divorce is made more complex by the fact that
American law, at least theoretically, does not permit the contract
of marriage to be dissolved by bilateral rescission and much less
by unilateral cancellation or withdrawal. Both of these methods
are, of course, widely employed to terminate marriages which for
any number of reasons have become unsatisfactory to the partners
involved.
It seems safe to predict, therefore, that eventually there will
arise the classic case of the ex-wife who, having consented to a
divorce and a property settlement, will thereafter return to the
courts to relitigate her claims, stating that during the entire
proceedings leading to the divorce and financial settlement, she
was too frightened, bewildered and psychologically coerced to be
capable of having that minimum voluntariness and freedom from
fear which are an indispensable condition precedent for a valid
1965]
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consent and agreement to the settlement of multiple claims aris-
ing out of a contractual relationship which lasted for several
years.
When this future plaintiff ex-wife comes into court to repudi-
ate the settlement to which she agreed both she and her lawyers
will have some intriguing legal arguments to employ to buttress
her case. The right case and resourceful lawyers might force the
courts to come to some conclusions on the hard questions which
have been for some time floating in a sort of legal limbo on the
fringes of family law. Among the questions which the ex-wife
could try to force to a resolution are the following:
(1) If it can be demonstrated that the husband was the mov-
ing force in bringing about the divorce, could an ex-wife,
sometime after the divorce, allege and prove that, at the time
of the divorce, she was placed in a position of such shame,
humiliation and anger, that she was not able to and could not
have been expected to bargain in good faith with her husband
but was in effect pressured into accepting those financial terms
which would alone allow her husband to carry out his plans
for a remarriage?
(2) If time and circumstances have brought it about that
the plaintiff ex-wife has not remarried and that she is
prominently, unpleasantly and embarrassingly known as the
"first Mrs. A.B.C." would it be possible to plead this eventuality
as another factor why the ex-wife did not and could not at
the time of divorce insist upon a full indemnification of all her
claims arising out of the marital partnership? If, furthermore,
the ex-wife's chances of remarriage were substantially dimin-
ished by the subsequent prominence or notoriety of her
former husband would she have any colorable right to assert
that, at the time of her divorce proceedings, she simply was
not in a position to give a truly voluntary, meaningful and
binding consent to the settlement that was offered to her?
(3) If an ex-wife, having lived for a period without any
expressed grievance at the financial arrangement given her,
becomes a semi-invalid as a victim, let us say, of multiple
sclerosis, can her permanent disability be advanced as a reason
to renegotiate what she agreed to accept as the net worth of
her interest in her marital partnership? Even more difficult
and complex is the question of whether a state would ever
have the right to raise the issue of alleged coercion on a
prospective ex-wife by a husband when, for example, the
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ex-wife has become totally dependent on the state by reason
of chronic disability or involuntary unemployment.
If some readers conclude that all the foregoing hypotheticals
would be resolved against the ex-wife who consented at the
moment of divorce to the most advantageous bargain she could
secure, such conclusions but highlight the underlying basic as-
sumption in thinking about the ex-wife's position, she is entitled
only to that which she freely consents to accept.
These principles may be helpful as background in a considera-
tion of the rights of the ex-wife who never consented to a divorce
or to any financial settlement but who nonetheless, because of a
valid ex parte divorce secured by her husband, is truly divorced.
The woman who is legally turned into a divorcee although she
never appeared in court or consented to any decree of divorce or
property agreement is a very new creature in Anglo-American
law. She was prefigured in Williams v. North Carolina Ill and
introduced to the world in Estin2 and Vanderbilt.3 Her past is
unknown, her present status is ambiguous but her future may be
surprisingly eventful.
About eleven percent of America's annual 400,000 divorces are
"migratory", that is, secured by plaintiffs in one of the five states
with a residence requirement of less than a year. When one
spouse brings action in a foreign state the stay-at-home wife (or
husband) can elect to fight her case in an alien and probably
unsympathetic forum and accept as res judicata whatever the
court in the "quickie divorce" state decrees. On the other hand,
the wife may elect not to appear in any way in the divorce
proceedings; thereafter she may exercise her right to attack col-
laterally her husband's divorce decree in the courts of her home
state.
Both of these strategies have their advantages but the non-
appearing wife faces the built-in possibility that her husband may
convert his residence in another state into a domicile or at least
into a non-attackable, presumptively valid domicile. At the
moment when this phenomenon occurs the plaintiff husband has
SWilliams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
2 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
3 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
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in his possession a valid ex parte divorce and his non-appearing,
non-consenting spouse becomes an ex-wife with her rights to be
determined according to that elusive newcomer to family law,
"divisible divorce".
One need not review the long and tortuous story by which the
"matrimonial domicile" of Haddock4 became "divisible divorce"
in Estin to realize the fact that neither the courts nor society have
really thought out what justice requires for the wife who has
become a divorced women without her consent. Indeed Estin and
Vanderbilt hardly raise the relevant and important questions;
these decisions tend to rest their main arguments on the ground
that the states in which involuntarily divorced ex-wives reside
may decline to support these women on the basis that an aban-
doned ex-wife may look to the assets of her former husband
within the state where he formerly lived with her but in which
he now neither has his domicile or residence and in which he
could legally remarry. The valid ex parte divorce, in the words
of Mr. Justice Douglas, did not extinguish all the "roots and
tendrils" of the marriage it dissolved.
The law appears to be caught in a basic contradiction regard-
ing the rights of the woman divorced by an ex parte decree. As
the dissent in Vanderbilt pointed out, the law gives no right to
the stay-at-home wife to protest or to prevent the dissolution of
her marriage in a foreign jurisdiction. Yet the law has now
decreed that, although a wife may be involuntarily deprived of
her status as a married woman, she may not be deprived of the
right to reach those assets of her ex-husband which he may have
left in the state where he last lived with his wife.
It may well be, as Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Vanderbilt
noted, that many wives value their status as married women much
more than their right to some form of alimony or support. Is it
therefore logical, consistent or fair to permit husbands to acquire
a valid divorce without even their wives' acquiescence, yet grant
to the same ex-wives the lesser right of whatever support from
their ex-husbands' assets they can acquire by a court decree in
the last state of cohabitation? There is logic, of course, in saying
that an ex parte divorce decree cannot terminate the property
rights of the non-appearing spouse, but perhaps it would be more
4 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
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logical to hold that the involuntarily divorced ex-wife should be
able to compel her ex-husband to come into the courts of her
domicile in order to have an adjudication of her rights in the
financial assets of the marital partnership which her husband has
severed without her consent.
"Divisible divorce" therefore appears to be a term which
obscures more questions than it resolves. It seems to mean essen-
tially that the breaking of the marriage bond, unconsented to by
one party, does not terminate all the bases of the rights of the
spouses involved. These rights continue presumably until such
time as a wife may somehow be deemed to have consented or
acquiesced in her husband's divorce, by a failure to assert her
rights, by reliance on her status as a divorced woman or by some
other action or non-action from her husband and the world could
reasonably conclude that she has forfeited or renounced whatever
rights she may have as a non-consensual divorcee.
The theory of "divisible divorce" assumes or asserts a defini-
tion of marriage which would include a wife's right to virtually
perpetual support as an inseparable part of the marriage contract.
Estin and Vanderbilt do not, of course, expressly reach this con-
clusion but rest on the unchallengeable principle that the property
rights of a wife may not be terminated without in personam
jurisdiction. By employing this simple legal rule the Court was
able to avoid some basic questions such as the following:
(1.) From what concept of the marriage relation does the right
of an ex-wife to support derive?
(2.) Does every ex-wife who refuses to consent to her hus-
band's out-of-state divorce action have an inherent and
not merely a statutory right to seek support from her
former husband? Furthermore, should such a right extend
not merely to the assets which the husband has left in the
ex-wife's state of residence but to all his assets wherever
they may be?
(3.) Would a failure on the part of an ex-wife to assert her
rights over an extended period give any right to her for-
mer husband to rely on the extinction of whatever rights
his former spouse may have asserted?
(4.) Should an ex-husband be permitted to employ those de-
fenses to an award of alimony which were available to
him in the state where he secured a valid, ex parte
1965]
216 KEUCKY LAW JoURNAL [Vol. 53,
divorce? Should a husband, for example, be allowed to
show the adultery of his wife in a proceeding in the state
of matrimonial domicile in a suit in which she is the
plaintiff when, as in Florida, a divorce obtained because of
the wife's adultery precludes alimony?
If these questions seem somewhat fanciful and far-fetched it
is only because ex-wives, divorced involuntarily by ex parte
decrees, who have the perseverance to fight for alimony are rare.
But the number of ex-wives turned into divorcees by legal
proceedings in which they did not appear and in which the
tribunal granting the divorce denied them alimony appears to be
very large and probably growing. It may be that the financial
needs of these women will force an increasing number of states
to enact legislation permitting involuntary ex-wives to reach the
assets of their ex-husbands within the state of the last marital
residence.
Such laws, however, would help only a very few of the more
well-to-do reluctant ex-wives. Such a law would, of course, be
more useful if it included within it a provision to the effect that
if property were removed from the state by the husband within
one year prior to the out-of-state ex parte decree such an act
would raise a rebuttable presumption that the removal was
effected for the purpose of defrauding his wife of her right to
support and alimony.
A satisfactory law providing for the economic needs of the
involuntary ex-wife can hardly be written until law and society
have come to some rather fundamental conclusions regarding the
validity and the duration of an ex-wife's right to support. It seems
clear that contemporary indecisiveness about this issue causes
prospective ex-wives who actually do not want a divorce to
accept one in return for a financial settlement which, their lawyer
counsels them, would in all probability not be available to them
if they refused to enter within their home state into the usual
"Wife-Plaintiff-Cruelty" divorce action which so often is a mock-
ery of any true legal proceeding. The great uncertainty about the
rights of an ex-wife who has no in personam decree against her
husband is, moreover, clearly an inducement to wives to appear
as a defendant in a foreign state in a quasi-fictitious suit in which
a pre-arranged financial settlement is given the appearance and
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respectability of a judicial decision thoughtfully pondered and
wisely decreed.
Not a little of the hypocrisy and not a few of the legal fictions
in domestic relations courts therefore can be attributed to the fact
that law and society have been reluctant and indeed unwilling to
come to firm conclusions with regard to the nature of the right of
ex-wives to support and alimony. Lawyers and judges have
substituted for real thought in this area the half-truth that every
case must be decided on its own facts.
There exist two extreme but seldom articulated positions on
the question of an ex-wife's right to support. One position would
argue that it can be demonstrated from statutory and decisional
law that an ex-wife-and in particular the involuntarily divorced
wife-has an inherent and life-long right to support in the manner
to which she was accustomed during the period of the marriage.
So long as a woman legally carries the name of her husband, this
line of reasoning would urge, she is entitled to that support which
every man agrees to supply when he enters the contract of
marriage. This right to support survives the dissolution of the
marriage bond by a divorce.
The second position is at the other extreme and would
advocate-or at least suggest as discussable-that ex-wives do not
have a vested right to perpetual support since it is totally unreal-
istic to think of them as the "innocent" wronged party. Their con-
duct or attitudes or selfishness probably entered into the failure of
the marriage so that they should not be permitted to live off the
resources of their ex-husbands as if they were blameless. Such a
result should be forbidden particularly in those cases where con-
tinued substantial alimony would in effect prevent the ex-husband
from entering a second marriage or at least from providing
adequately for a second wife and second family.
Very few spouses, judges or litigants adopt either of these
polarized views. All theories about the rights of ex-wives collapse
in confrontation with the realities of the basic and undeniable
fact that hardly any man, unless he be wealthy, can support an
ex-wife and a second wife in any way approaching the manner
to which they have been accustomed.
Despite the overwhelming truth that virtually no remarried
ex-husband can "support" his ex-wife, courts and judges continue
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to repeat the platitudes and pieties that underlie the rule that a
divorced man must "support" his former wife. Such a rule may
have been wise in past generations when few women worked and
when a respectable remarriage for a divorcee was almost impos-
sible. But clearly some new paths of thought must be chartered
if law and society are to make some reasonable accommodation
between the right granted to an ex-husband to remarry and the
fact that an ex-wife is seldom if ever a completely "innocent" wife
deserted and abandoned by a "guilty" husband. In seeking to
define the concept of an "ex-wife" and to refine notions about her
rights, all considerations of the fact that many if not most ex-wives
serve in the capacity of mothers and housewives for their minor
children are omitted in this paper. The rights of the children of
divorce constitute a separate subject which has been discussed
by this writer elsewhere.5 The precise problem in the discussion
which follows is the task of identifying the rights of an ex-wife
who has been validly divorced by a foreign ex parte decree.
It sometimes appears that it is conceivable that the courts
could eventually cut the heart out of a foreign valid ex parte
divorce granted to a husband-plaintiff. By such a decree a hus-
band may not cut off his wife's right to a property and alimony
settlement nor may he deprive her of the right to custody of the
children of the marriage, as May v. Anderson6 made clear. No
reported case has yet appeared in which a foreign divorce court
has ruled in an ex parte decree that a "guilty" non-appearing ex-
wife must cease using her married name. One would suppose
that, if such a court cannot terminate a wife's right to alimony
and to custody of her children, it cannot deprive a woman of the
most tangible legal evidence of her marriage, her assumption of
her husband's name.
It appears increasingly clearer, therefore, that the spouse who
secures a "divisible divorce" receives a mere legal right to have a
second spouse but is not relieved of many of the obligations of the
first marriage.
Aside from the question of the full faith and credit due to the
ex parte decree-a problem not really resolved in a very satis-
8 Drinan, The Rights of Children Whose Parents are Divorced, flhinois Law
Forum, 618 (1962).
9 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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factory way in Estin and Vanderbilt-there is emerging, with in-
creasing frequency and deepening urgency, the basic policy ques-
tion of whether law and society should permit the further growth
of a class of remarried ex-husbands, the security of whose second
marriages and second families may be severely threatened by the
presence of unresolved claims of an ex-wife.
An attempt has been made to prevent injustice to ex-wives
by the familiar proposal that, before a man could enter a second
marriage, he must demonstrate to the appropriate official that he
is satisfying his obligations to his former wife. If such a proposal
were carried out it would at least put ex-wives on notice that their
former husbands are planning a remarriage. Such a plan, how-
ever, could only be helpful on an intra-state basis and could be
easily evaded by ex-husbands contracting a second marriage at
any of the numerous out-of-state "marriage mills." Such a scheme,
moreover, would be of no service at all to the ex-wife who,
involuntarily divorced in an ex parte decree, has filed no claim
against her ex-husband, much less reduced it to judgment.
What therefore should law and society do for the wife who
refuses or is unable to appear in a foreign forum established by
her husband where he secures an ex parte decree of divorce which
subsequently is converted into a collaterally unimpeachable judg-
ment entitled to full faith and credit in every state? The following
considerations may be helpful:
(1.) Perhaps the familiar and seldom analyzed adage that
an ex-husband must "support" his ex-wife could be restated in
terms of treating the marriage as a contractual partnership of a
unique nature. Thus the wife who is divorced without her con-
sent could be analogized to the creditor in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing who is virtually forced to settle for a part of his claim when
his debtor becomes insolvent.
Following this line of reasoning the non-consenting ex-wife
would be required to recognize the bankruptcy of the marriage
she entered and accept as full compensation for all her claims a
lump sum settlement adjudicated to be equal to her share of the
assets of an insolvent partnership. The most serious difficulty
with this analogy is its apparent assumption that either party to
a marriage can unilaterally have the marriage declared to be in a
state of bankruptcy. Courts, publicists and a deep-seated and
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widespread moral conviction have always insisted that one
partner to a marriage, especially the husband and breadwinner,
cannot in justice be permitted to withdraw from the marriage
partnership without the fault or consent of the other partner.
The very possibility of a valid ex parte divorce has eroded the
traditional position of the law in forbidding a one-sided cancella-
tion of the tripartite marriage contract. If, therefore, the valid
ex parte decree is to remain available-and there appears to be
no discernible movement to eliminate its existence-a new theory
of compensating the involuntarily divorced spouse seems to be
called for.
A step towards developing that theory could be the elimina-
tion of the somewhat meaningless assertion that an ex-husband
must "support" his former spouse and a substitution for that
ambiguous formula a rule that a wife may under certain cir-
cumstances be compelled to accept a share of the assets of a
marriage which has entered into receivership.
A contemplation of a new formula of this nature leads one
inevitably into the question of the wisdom of continuing to
employ the adversary procedure with grounds and defenses as
the legal method by which marriages are dissolved. The entire
problem of employing "guilt" or "innocence" in trials for divorce
cannot really be separated from the fairness of "divisible divorce."
Let us therefore analyze the background of present divorce pro-
cedures.
(2.) It is never recalled often enough that the American
method of granting divorces on the basis of "grounds" to the
"innocent" party against the "guilty" spouse was taken from the
practice of the English ecclesiastical courts in which only a
separation was granted and never a divorce a vinculo. Both be-
fore and after the Reformation and in fact up until the year 1857
the ecclesiastical courts of England had exclusive jurisdiction
over mariage and separation. It was only in 1857 that divorce
became available in the civil courts, not from an act of Parliament,
and it was in that year in England-and around that time in
America-that non-ecclesiastical courts began to award divorces
a vinculo for the first time in the history of Anglo-American law.
The judicial action for divorce adopted by the civil courts was
not the customary procedure used for cases of broken contracts
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or alleged torts but rather the machinery employed by the
ecclesiastical courts for several centuries, not to give divorces but
only to grant judicial separations. Hence the processes adopted
in all American jurisdictions for litigation that might result in a
decree of divorce were never intended and have never really been
suitable to the type of action contemplated in a petition for
divorce.
For many years and indeed for several decades there has been
a growing realization in America that the pretensions, fictions
and outright hypocrisy involved in the widespread use of quasi-
collusive arrangements to secure divorces indicate that a funda-
mental change in the manner of handling domestic relations cases
is needed. It may be that the emergence of the ex parte but valid
dissolution of marriage with its corollary of "divisible divorce" is
in effect an answer of an almost unconscious nature to the de-
mands for a change in basic procedures in family law. The uncon-
tested divorce has eroded the procedures based on guilt or
innocence borrowed from the ecclesiastical courts; the divorce in
which the defending party neither consents nor appears is in
effect the ultimate repudiation of the adversary system in do-
mestic relations cases.
It seems clear that uncontested and unconsented-to divorces
will continue and probably increase in number so long as the
present adversary procedure is employed. A contested divorce
is employed more as a threat by which spouses can secure better
property or visitation rights than as a judicial means to discover
the more culpable partner in a marriage which has resulted in
failure.
(3.) Amid all the confusion and ambiguity which surrounds
some of the most fundamental questions of divorce and family
law the whole notion of "divisible divorce" stands as an isolated
legal-constitutional conundrum actually relevant to only a few
but highly significant to everyone.
"Divisible divorce" could not have become a reality but for
the validation by the United States Supreme Court of the ex parte
decree of divorce. Such validation was in itself an implicit revolt
against many venerable traditions. The severe limitation placed
on the ex parte decree by the Supreme Court's gloss on the full
faith and credit clause in the "divisible divorce" doctrine has
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added to the general confusion regarding the nature and legal
meaning of marriage and divorce. And, as in so many other areas,
legislators and judges look to the Supreme Court of the United
States not merely for the resolution of constitutional questions but
for the establishment of basic public policy.
If any lesson is clear from the Supreme Court's two attempts,
in Estin and Vanderbilt, to deal with the nature of the ex parte
divorce it is that the desirability and accessibility of ex parte
decrees of divorce and the availability of post-decree alimony to
non-appearing wives are questions far too complex to be resolved
in technical cases revolving around the full faith and credit
clause.
A thorough, candid and realistic investigation of foreign and
ex parte divorces is therefore long overdue. A massive search by
a highly sophisticated group of social scientists would develop
facts and statistics of a most significant nature. Until the results
of that study are available, jurists and legal writers will continue
to discuss ex parte decrees and the rights of ex-wives in a manner
that is so conceptualistic and legalistic as to be almost totally
unrealistic and unreliable.
